inclusive and environmentally friendly management plan for the marine park. Research on the divergent perspectives of groups (villagers versus the state, activists versus corporations) has produced very important works on the topic (Peluso 1995; Brosius 2000 Brosius , 2001 Brosius , 2003 . However, as Tsing (2001) notes, differences among allies has been less explored (but see Baviskar 1995; Peluso 1995; Reed 2003; Sturgeon 1997) . In this article, I examine the conflicts among apparent allies in the quest for environmental protection, and on how the environmental truth (in the name of global environmentalism) of donor organizations shaped the creation of a management plan in the Archipelago. I also briefly discuss my role as an observer and marginal participant in the creation and development of the plan. The process of the creation of the Assembly and the development of the plan illustrate both the efficacy and the limits of grassroots activism in situations of uneven status and power.
Environmental Truths
Global environmentalism grew in force in the 1980s and 1990s. This type of environmentalism can be defined as the environmental politics of politicians, resource managers, and scientists, who-partly as a result of their international recognition-"imagined themselves to be in charge of worldwide environmental management programs" (Greenough and Tsing 2001:4) . Examples of well-known causes of global environmentalism include rain forest management, global warming policies, or marine resources harvesting. Within this context, global environmentalists have taken the position of "defenders" of the environment and of those who-according to their agenda-support environmental sustainability, most notably indigenous peoples. The way in which indigenous (or local) knowledge is viewed and used by donor organizations depends on their conceptions of "environmental truth," and this needs to be understood within the recent shift of interest of these organizations. According to Chapin (2004) , large environmental organizations (which started at a small scale from the 1940s to the 1970s) moved from a language of science in the 1970s and 1980s to a language of "inclusion" in the 1990s (mostly as a result of pressure from indigenous peoples) and more recently back to a language of science and conservation because of changes in funding sources. Funding sources have shifted from mostly individual and private foundations to mostly private corporations (e.g. Chevron, Texaco, Shell, Monsanto) and bilateral and multilateral organizations (e.g. USAID and the World Bank), which makes the donor foundations accountable to these organizations and transforms discourse from one that incorporates indigenous knowledge to one that gives primacy to scientific language (2004:17-20) . Framing research and advocacy agendas as "global" has given strong advantage to environmentalists, because their work becomes perceived as urgent and thus more relevant. In short, the globality of the conservationist agenda has created "a powerful scientific imagery and an effective political tool" (Tsing 2001:11) .
Indigenous peoples have fit the environmental and indigenous rights rhetoric of the incomparable qualities of "indigenous knowledge" (Brosius 2000:293) . Focusing specifically on the case of Penan resistance to logging in the Malaysian state of Sarawak (on the island of Borneo in the 1980s), Brosius (2000) argues that the environmentalists who visited the Penan (particularly the Eastern Penan) developed an environmental discourse on the significance of Penan indigenous knowledge. Brosius finds at least two different conceptions of indigenous knowledge, the objectivist conception and the environmentalist conception. The objectivist conception concerns itself with "the structural or systemic nature of indigenous knowledge and its utilitarian or adaptive significance" (2000:297) . The environmentalist conception of indigenous knowledge, based on travel by activists to areas inhabited by indigenous peoples, stresses knowledge from a western perspective: knowledge of the environment by indigenous peoples is observed by the activist, usually recorded with the help of a translator, and supported by ethnographic information. The result of these accounts (as books, messages, documents, or fund-raising letters) is a product that becomes a "tool of persuasion." As such, it must present indigenous peoples in a positive light. This is done through different arguments, including making links between the existence of the rainforest and survival of humankind, or connecting "indigenous knowledge to the sacred or the ineffable, partaking of a semantic shift that transforms 'knowledge' into wisdom, spiritual insight or some other such quality" (Brosius 2000:298; Perry 1996) .
However, as Ellen and Harris (2000) assert, the term indigenous knowledge itself is by no means clear (cf. Sepez 2005) . This term needs to refer to indigenous peoples, itself a difficult and political concept, for "measuring indigenousness is not an exact science" (2000:3) . In addition, indigenous knowledge has been clearly related to the major "science wars" debates, regarding the extent to which indigenous peoples have helped to develop and maintain the territories that have become the priority of global conservationists. Ellen and Harris state that the term "traditional knowledge" should be more appropriate, for it seems to have received more credibility (2000:3) . They understand indigenous or traditional knowledge as local knowledge ("rooted to a particular place and set of experiences, and generated by people living in those places"), orally-transmitted, or transmitted through imitation and demonstration, the consequence of practical engagement in everyday life, empirical, and based on repetition to obtain retention (2000:4-5) .
The case discussed in this article illustrates some of the tensions that arise between globally oriented organizations and local populations even when they form an alliance with presumably common goals.
Marine Protected Areas
Marine protected areas are "areas designated for special protection to enhance the management of marine resources" (National Research Council 2001:1) . Foster and Lemay (1988) consider MPAs "special management areas" whose main function ranges from single-purpose protected areas to multiple use areas (1988:4) . Keheller, Bleakley, and Wells (1995) propose the following definition, adopted by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) in 1987: Marine protected areas are "any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment" (1995:2) . Research has demonstrated that marine protected areas and reserves indeed support the conservation of marine resources as part of an incorporated coastal and marine area management (National Research Council 2001:2) .
MPAs occupy less than one percent of the marine environment, but they have increased in numbers in the last twenty-five years. However, management and evaluation of the areas has not been common until the past decade (National Research Council 2001:xi, 13; Houde 2001) . Protection of marine areas is a difficult task because of the false assumption that the vastness of the ocean prevents it from being overused or negatively impacted despite clear evidence that uncontrolled human activity disrupts marine ecosystems (National Research Council 2001:2) . The management of protected areas is complex; it not only includes the development of appropriate plans to manage marine ecosystems, but also the management challenges that arise from social, economic, and institutional structures (cf. Falquem, Alessi, and Lamotte 2002; Salm, Clark, and Siirila 2000) .
Until recently, one of the main problems surrounding the management of MPAs has been a philosophical one: a tendency to protect specific species as opposed to focusing on the need to protect a space. By focusing on specific species, the needs of other species or the human populations that live near the species are ignored. Moreover, the species-specific approach generally taken by managers "may fail to address changes that affect productivity throughout the ecosystem" and it "does not resolve the difficulties of either managing multiple stocks or accurately assessing the status of marine species" (National Research Council 2001:2-3) . A spatial focus has been acknowledged as a more comprehensive approach, and has been used on land with relative success. Only recently, its results have been replicated in marine areas. Environmental organizations have recognized that a comprehensive approach incorporating nature conservation and economic development can only be achieved by considering ecological, resource use, and socioeconomic concerns as interconnected (Young 2003:30) .
The Archipelago of Bocas del Toro and the Bastimentos Island National Marine Park
Lying within the borders of Panama, the Archipelago of Bocas del Toro is a multicultural community composed of Afro-Antilleans, indigenous populations, Chinese-Panamanians, Latinos, and permanent and semi-permanent expatriates from Europe, the United States, and New zealand ( Figure  1 ). Approximately 18,000 inhabitants are distributed on nine inhabited islands. The Archipelago supported one of the most prosperous banana plantations in Central America from the end of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, when the United Fruit Company moved its headquarters to the mainland. Since then until the early 1990s, the economy of the Archipelago was stagnant and mostly based on small-scale agriculture, fishing, and bureaucratic jobs. Starting in the 1990s, tourism became the most important industry in the region. In February 1993, Bocas del Toro was declared a zone of Tourism Development of National Interest, and the Organization of American States' 1998 report placed Bocas del Toro as one of the main areas of touristic development in the country. Currently, the Panamanian Bureau of Tourism, known by its Spanish acronym, IPAT (Instituto Panameño de Turismo), aggressively markets the islands as the finest example of ecotourism (Guerrón-Montero 2003) .
One of the most important attractions in the Archipelago is the Bastimentos Island National Marine Park (Parque Nacional Marino Isla Bastimentos PNMIB) (Anicetti 1998; IPAT 1990; International Technical Cooperation Agreement 1993) . The park is located in a region declared "particularly sensitive" by the International Maritime Organization (Stanley 1995:13), as its marine seascape supports the interaction of three distinct ecosystems: coral reefs, mangrove stands, and sea grass beds. The IUCN, through its Strategy for the Conservation of Living Marine Resources and Processes in the Caribbean Region, proposed priority areas for marine resources conservation in 1979. This strategic plan included Bocas del Toro as one of the suggested areas with multiple resources that needed to be conserved (Stanley 1995:28) . A few years earlier, in 1971, the document Inventory and Demonstration of Forests, Panama: National Development Plan for National Parks (FAO) suggested that a national park was needed in Bocas del Toro, specifically in Bastimentos. The area was included in the National System of Protected Areas of Panama.
On September 2, 1988, the Institute of Renewable Natural Resources (Instituto de Recursos Naturales Renovables, INRENARE), now called the National Environmental Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, ANAM) officially created the PNMIB. The PNMIB is state-run and it is the only national park in the country classified as a marine park. The park was developed under a species-specific approach to the protection of marine ecosystems. The main goal of the park was to conserve a "representative sample of the marine and coastal ecosystems" of the region, with special attention to those supporting marine turtles (Mou Sue 1993:163) . A second consideration for the creation of the park was its use for recreational and tourism purposes. The populations that lived and depended on the area were not asked for feedback regarding limits and use of terrestrial and marine resources (cf. Abbink 2004:283) . The Panamanian authorities, apparently without consultation with any of the local stakeholders, arbitrarily decided to establish a MPA in the area. This situation led to a feeling of helplessness and resentment on the part of local residents who had traditionally used the resources and who were threatened by what they considered coercive conservation (cf. Hitchcock 1997:82) .
1 As the National Research Council notes, users of marine resources do not always embrace the concept of MPAs or welcome them when instituted. Stakeholders may distrust managers and scientists, especially when confronted with the possibility of losing their customary access privileges. Also, competing users [. . .] may perceive inequities in the allocation of privileges of MPAs. These problems are especially prevalent when stakeholders are not fully involved in the design and planning of MPAs (2001:14; cf. Schwartz and Deruyttere 1996) .
The park encompasses 13,360 hectares (11,730 marine and 1630 terrestrial) (Figure 2 ). It is a very ecologically diverse site, and includes beautiful ancient coral shelf reefs, believed to be 15,000 to 20,000 years old. The reefs contain 52 of the 71 identified species of Caribbean coral, and they are home to over 250 species of fish and marine mammals including manatees and dolphins. Other ecosystems in the park include tropical rainforests and mangrove swamps. The park includes part of the island of Bastimentos, the Cayo zapatilla Major and Minor islands, and a number of small islands near Bastimentos. The park is well visited by tourists. In fact, the common indicator used by IPAT to measure tourism growth in Bocas is the number of visitors to the PNMIB. ANAM is the official agency in charge of managing the park. The park has an interpretive path that runs through one of the islands, zapatilla Cay Major, where the park rangers' headquarters are located. Prior to 1992, Panamanian government documents for the management of its marine protected areas did not contain systematic plans to "ensure that management objectives specific to a particular country [were] clearly defined" (Stanley 1995:20) .
Figure 1. Panama and Location of Archipelago of Bocas del Tor
The literature on MPAs attests to the lack of effective management of these areas in the Caribbean (Keheller, Bleakley, and Wells 1995; National Research Council 2001) . In fact, Stanley (1995) notes that two-thirds of the protected areas in the Caribbean are not efficiently managed (Stanley 1995:32) . In the case of the PNMIB, despite the efforts of ANAM, local environmental and civil organizations felt that there was insufficient concern for the ecological situation of the region, and especially, that there was no representation of local populations in the environmental issues that affected them. Since the park was formed, the director and two rangers spent most of their time in zapatilla Cay Major, the only island where there were services available for the park caretakers. From a tourism perspective, there were no attractions or facilities provided for tourists in the park, with the exception of an interpretive path and a picnic table in zapatilla Cay Major.
In addition, some stakeholders felt that their needs had not been considered when the park was developed. For example, representatives of the indigenous Ngöbe communities that utilize the resources of the area felt that their needs and rights were not taken into account when developing the park's limits. The limits infringed upon the Ngöbe's subsistence territories, and the prohibitions established on specific species did not contemplate that the Ngöbe in this area rely heavily on fishing as a subsistence strategy. As Mou Sue (1993) notes, "many fishermen [also] obtain a large amount of their economic earnings through commercial fishing of species inside the park" (1993:172). The Ngöbe are also the major stakeholders (90 percent) in the use of park land for subsistence agriculture, although they do not live in the park. The majority of the Ngöbe who live around the area were not aware of the actual limits of the park, and enforcement of boundaries was very difficult due to lack of monitoring resources.
In spite of the prohibitions and regulations, the Ngöbe and Afro-Antilleans fished and hunted for subsistence and for cash income, thus contributing to the destruction of coral reefs and the fauna and flora of the region. The situation became more complicated with the demand placed by the tourism industry on fishing. These problems arose because different zones had not been proposed for the park to accommodate multiple stakeholders; the focus had been almost entirely on the conservation of specific marine species.
The PNMIB was not conceived with the needs of the population that lived near the park in mind but rather with strictly conservationist goals (Mou Sue 1993:163) . It was built around the areas identified as rich in marine resources and with tourism potential. As with other marine areas in the world, this idea was "based primarily on ecological criteria and tourism value [but] it did not reflect the realities of use patterns within the park, and assumed that use by local communities was incompatible with either conservation or tourism goals" (Usher 2000:252) . This reflects the notion prevalent in the 1980s that an area could be either used and abused or conserved, but that both paradigms could not coexist. As a result of the unrealistic goal of developing a conservationist model in the PNMIB without the necessary human, technical or financial resources to do so, problems and feelings of resentment ensued.
A Response from the Bocatorenean Society
A group of concerned Bocatoreneans of different cultural backgrounds felt that the Panamanian government had ignored their needs, instituted changes without consultation, and allowed corruption to flourish. As a result, they united to create what they hoped would be an efficient management plan for the PNMIB. Although the group did not represent the interests and needs of all the stakeholders, they were able to attract international funding and governmental attention. Organizations such as the IUCN and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) have been especially concerned with the protection and sustainability of marine resources in the Caribbean Basin, or as the IUCN calls it, Wider Caribbean. In 1979, the IUCN developed a strategic planning process to collect data and map the general marine environment, habitats, species, socio-economic information, and legal jurisdiction of this region. They have also been concerned-to a degree-with the relationship between this environment and indigenous peoples, viewing them as the stewards of global biodiversity (cf. Brosius 2003:95) . The TNC also has a program for the management of parks in the region. The PNMIB was identified by the TNC as one of the 37 "critical parks and reserves" Given the status of Bastimentos as one of the areas of importance of their projects, the TNC, IUCN, and PROARCA/COSTAS 3 developed a relationship with local and regional NGOs and other organizations and funded the project to develop the PNMIB management plan. As a result of these conversations, four NGOs, nine governmental organizations such as IPAT, the Ministry of Education, and ANAM, a US-based scientific organization (Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, STRI), and the funding agencies (TNC and PROARCA/COSTAS) invited leaders of eight indigenous communities and two non-indigenous communities that lived around the park areas to join the Consulting Assembly (Consejo Consultivo). The Assembly was conceived as an organization of coordination between the civil society and the authorities of the government (Monge 2000:3) . The Assembly was directed by a smaller Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo) formed by six representatives from the larger body, who made propositions, reviewed recommendations and brought them to the Consulting Assembly. 4 The Assembly met every two to three months from mid-1997 to mid-2000. They held all-day meetings, where they discussed better alternatives and solutions to environmental problems faced by the PNMIB (Figure 3 ). They also held workshop sessions to develop an inclusive management plan for the park.
Although indirectly, the plan was framed within the notion that ecotourism was the most efficient and environmentally sound tourism alternative for the park and, by extension, for the Archipelago. Based on these meetings, the Consulting Assembly created a management plan for the park. The plan responded to the following four main objectives: 1) To improve the protection, conservation, and management of the marine and terrestrial resources of the park and its areas of influence with local communal participation. 2) To promote conservation and sustainable use of resources through environmental education campaigns. 3) To support and promote scientific research and biological education in marine and coastal studies. 4) To contribute to a better use of the resources in the park and its area of influence with the ideals of conservation of those resources (Consejo Consultivo 1999b).
In order to facilitate its implementation, the plan was divided into several action plans or sub-programs. These plans were to provide "an organized structure of the objectives, goals, strategies and management activities included in the plan" (Consejo Consultivo 1999b:1). The action plans included the following issues: 1) administration and development of the park; 2) protection and control of the biodiversity of the park and its area of multiple uses; 3) demarcation of the limits of the area and its area of multiple use; 4) ordering and regulation of diving and other recreational activities; 5) sustainable management of fisheries; 6) protection of marine turtle populations; 7) control of specific and dispersed sources of water contamination; 8) environmental interpretation; 9) development of environmental education; and 10) promotion of research and monitoring (Consejo Consultivo 1999b) .
In regard to administration and development of the park, the plan suggested hiring in a period of two years five more rangers (in addition to the two already employed), a person in charge of protection, a person in charge of environmental education and research, and an administrator. The plan also recommended providing technical and first aid equipment, two boats, lifejackets, radio equipment, sanitary services, and a covered area for picnics, as well as two control posts in a period of three years. Finally, the plan recommended creating a Visitors Center on Colon Island to control number of visitors and entrance payment, and to inform tourists about the activities they could and could not conduct in the park. They also suggested that the Consulting Assembly and the Executive Committee become permanent support groups for the Park, by requesting from ANAM legal continuity of these two committees (Consejo Consultivo 1999b:2-4).
In regard to the protection and control of the park, the document identified as the main problems the lack of resources and lack of legal and technical training of the current personnel. The goal of this section of the document is presented as "to reduce to zero in the next five years the illegal activities carried out within the park" (Consejo Consultivo 1999b:7). In order to do so, the plan suggested the development of cooperation, control, and monitoring mechanisms among ANAM, the Marine Authority, and IPAT.
On the subject of park limit demarcation, the plan noted that there had been minimal care in enforcing the limits of the park, both in the marine and terrestrial areas. The plan also mentioned the lack of interpretive paths, with the exception of the one on zapatilla Cay Major. The goal of the plan on this particular matter was to make clear delimitations of the park and its area of influence by placing signs and buoys, and by creating a detailed map of the critical areas inside the park and the areas of multiple use, indicating the places where scuba 1999b:14) . Because the members of the Assembly and the Ngöbe (community leaders as well as members of each community) participated in the creation of this mapping, these maps brought together the authority of the technical with the authority of the traditional (cf. Tsing 2001:17) .
Another important subprogram was related to the sustainable management of fisheries. In this case, the plan stated that several evaluations of the resources in the park (Del Cid et al. 1997; Valdespinos y Santamaría 1997) indicated that populations of marine fauna had gone down dramatically in the last year, which had reduced substantially the economic income of indigenous and Afro-Antillean families that depended on these resources (1997:20) . This was particularly the case for resources such as the Queen conch (Strombus gigas), lobsters (Panulirus argus), octopi (Octopus species), and the variety of fish locally known as pati (Lutjamus synagris) (Guerrón-Montero 2004) . Therefore, the plan proposed the implementation of closed seasons, control of the size of the species captured and control of fishing techniques and exploitation of resources in the area of multiple use and reserve, and elimination of extraction of resources within the park (Consejo Consultivo 1999b:20) . The plan also discussed the need to have sufficient biological information about the park's resources easily available for the fishermen.
The general strategy proposed in the plan to obtain the necessary resources for the management of the plan was to request funds from the government (from ANAM and IPAT in particular), to establish alliances with private businesses that would benefit from the maintenance and improvement of the park (tourism operators, hotel owners, water sports owners), and to apply to international conservationist organizations for funds. The organizations in charge of implementing these activities included the government through ANAM and IPAT, the personnel of the park, the Consulting Assembly and Executive Committee, and local and regional environmental and conservationist organizations.
Overall, the Consulting Assembly followed the evidentyet rarely utilized-notion that "effective implementation of marine reserves and protected areas depends on participation by the community of stakeholders in developing the management plan" (National Research Council 2001:4; emphasis added; cf. World Ecotourism Summit 2002) . Consultation with the community as a process "through which the donor or government agency communicates with and informs communities of its goals and actions" is essential for positive outcomes in sustainable development (Schwartz and Deruyttere 1996:5 ; emphasis in original text). More specifically, there is also consensus among MPA managers and planners that management of marine areas can only be successful if the communities impacted by them support it (Horrill 2000:348) . The Panamanian government did not take this approach when the national park was first created. This provoked resentment on the part of Archipelago residents toward the government, feeling that they were placed in competition with the environment and that their expertise and knowledge were not integrated into the process. This was true for Afro-Antilleans and indigenous peoples, although because of previous historic stereotypes these ethnic groups hold of each other, each group blamed the other for being "destroyers of the environment" (cf. Wali 1989) . In addition, although it was not mentioned in the conversations, and perhaps it was not an explicit component of the group's agenda, one of the outcomes of the Consulting Assembly was to develop a plan that would focus on a spaces perspective rather than a species perspective. In sum, the Consulting Assembly advocated multi-stakeholder participation in the development and implementation of the management plan.
The Consulting Assembly recommended the development of a structure of co-management of the area through a trust (patronato), the extension of the limits of the park and its areas of influence; the establishment of a "Buffer zone," and a long-term financing plan for the park (Consejo Consultivo 1999a:3). The proposal to create a trust followed a regional trend in Latin America, in which innovative and creative ways to protect MPAs have developed due to limited governmental economic and human resources (Foster and Lemay 1988; Sundberg 2003) . The patronato was conceived as a legally recognized entity charged with implementing the management plan of the park and its zones of influence, and indirectly, controlling tourism development in the entire Archipelago.
One of the most interesting components of this process was the creation of new "zones of influence" within the marine park. The Consulting Assembly believed that the national government had not included all the zones that needed to be protected by the park, and-through their meetings, workshops of indigenous leaders in their own communities, and four studies conducted by international and national environmental NGOs-the assembly developed a new delimitation, which included not only the areas of the park, but also the areas influenced by the park. These areas astutely included islands inhabited by indigenous peoples, and larger portions of Bastimentos Island, which had become potential investment attractions for international developers. The areas, however, were presented in the plan as areas with a large diversity of flora and fauna, or as useful resources for indigenous peoples. Through this plan, they not only advocated for the protection of more diverse ecological areas and more indigenous communities; they also provided a strong argument for the need of the Panamanian government to take control of areas that were going to be rapidly appropriated and developed by foreign interests.
In accordance with other MPAs in the world (cf. Usher 2000:250) , the Consulting Assembly suggested zoning the park, based on specific conservation areas (mangrove, coral reefs and sea grass beds), species diversity and fragility, or endemic species (Consejo Consultivo 1999a:5). The zones proposed in the plan were a zone for the Reproduction of Marine Species; a zone for Scientific Reserves; and a zone for the Protection of Reefs (including mangroves and sea grass beds); a zone for Multiple Use; a Terrestrial zone for Recreation; a zone for the Protection of Aquatic Species; a zone for the Protection of Terrestrial Wetlands; and a zone for the Protection of Turtles (Consejo Consultivo 1999a:6). The zone for Scientific Reserve was conceived as a marine reserve zone, "where removal or disturbance of resources is prohibited, sometimes referred to as closed or 'no-take' areas" (National Research Council 2001:1).
For reasons that were not disclosed at the meetings, the TNC discontinued funding of the project in the year 2000. At this point, the Consulting Assembly had been able to develop the plan and submit it to the Moscoso government. The government did not act upon it with the celerity that was expected and, as of August 2005, the Assembly still had not received direct support for this initiative from the government.
5 Without any legal strength, the plan could not be implemented and the groups and individuals involved felt discouraged by the lack of both international funding and governmental support.
6 As a result, the Assembly is no longer working together. Its key members have turned to politics, have continued their work with environmental organizations, or have become actively involved in tourism enterprises.
Results and Analysis of the Plan
From 1998 to 2000, I participated as an observer in the all-day meetings where the Consulting Assembly developed the plan. I also actively participated in the workshops that were held during the meetings, and as an applied anthropologist, I was alert to pinpoint the successes, problems, and human conflicts of the process. Although this experience was an exemplary case of communal participation in conservation projects in Panama, 7 some quandaries could be identified. One serious problem in the process was that the asymmetrical relations between Afro-Antilleans and indigenous peoples present in Bocas were perpetuated in the assemblies. The Ngöbe, whose participation in the management plan was vital because of their close relationship with the resources of the park, have not been incorporated into Panamanian society, and although being the largest in number, have remained one of the most neglected indigenous groups in the country (cf. Cjording 1991). This situation complicated the already difficult dialogue among the actors.
In theory, every member of the assembly had the same rights and obligations. However, indigenous leaders' ideas were not given the same weight as those of Latinos, Mestizos, or Afro-Antilleans who were formally educated. Everyone could speak in the assembly, yet very rarely did indigenous people raise their hands to voice their opinions, and when they did, many times their ideas were quickly dismissed. Paternalism was evident in the discourses by national and local authorities, and there was ignorance of indigenous norms and behaviors. For instance, indigenous leaders were constantly criticized for presumably not knowing the cycles of reproduction of commercial species. Often times, the language used by the scientists at the meetings was unintelligible for the audience (cf. Fetterman 1993) . Overall, the Consulting Assembly favored "facts" and "hard data" presented by researchers from STRI or the local NGOs over the empirical experience of the Ngöbe who participated in the meetings. Consequently, there was a strong contradiction between the blind acceptance of indigenous values as harmoniously living with nature (environmental discourse of the NGOs) and the reaction towards the knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples conveyed at the meetings. Generally, their knowledge and practices were viewed as backward, destructive, and even dangerous. No effort was made by the Assembly to translate the wealth of empirical information of the Ngöbe into systematic social science data. Just as the government had ignored local stakeholders when creating the park, the members of the Assembly marginalized the indigenous stakeholders. Although ostensibly the participation of indigenous groups was very strong, in reality the opinions and values of indigenous peoples were either treated paternalistically or ignored.
This was particularly clear when a representative of Solarte requested help from the Consulting Assembly to undo a contract he had signed with a developer from the United States, who ultimately purchased most of the land owned by the Ngöbe on the island of Solarte. The Ngöbe leader presented their situation to the Assembly and argued that the indigenous peoples of Solarte had been tricked into selling their property for meager sums, with the promise that they would have electricity and running water and would eventually work for the owners of the houses and hotels that were going to be built on their lands. The reaction of most of the members of the assembly was of lack of appreciation for the Ngöbe's plight. They blamed the individual families for selling the land, noting that their situation was the result of their ambition (not an appropriate feeling for pristine indigenous peoples), lack of connections with the land, and improper economic desire. They argued that the Ngöbe had entered into a legal contract that they now needed to honor. Ultimately, the Assembly did not support the request of the indigenous representative, and did not act in accordance with its own rhetoric.
As mentioned above, in the final management plan for the Marine Park the assembly suggested hiring a director, five more park rangers, a research director, an environmental educator, and an administrator. The qualifications for these officers-except for the rangers 8 -included a B.A. degree, and in some cases, a masters degree (Consejo Consultivo 1999b:5) . In practice, this meant that only the representatives of the NGOs that initiated the process qualified for these positions, and that the members of the indigenous communities could, at best, only aspire to become rangers.
Another source of conflict was that between indigenous peoples and black populations, each one believing that the other was less able to live in harmony with the natural environment. Afro-Antilleans are regarded by non-AfroAntilleans (Latinos and indigenous peoples) as not having an overall understanding of nature's ways. During my residence in the town of Bocas del Toro, Afro-Antilleans rarely mentioned their knowledge of rainforest plants. However, I witnessed many tour guides pointing out the values of different plants to tourists when I accompanied them on guided tours. Knowledge of plant use was also very prevalent among Afro-Antilleans on the island of Bastimentos. In addition, many Afro-Antilleans were deeply concerned about the environmental impacts of over-development in their islands. Comments such as this one were common: "I think that in less that thirty years we will not be able to see Bocas del Toro as we see it today. We will not see the trees and the variety of plants, it will all be empty [pelado] . I do not want this to happen, I would like that something be left for us so we can survive as we always have." It is assumed by national and international conservation agencies that indigenous peoples have a special ability to live harmoniously with the environment, that indigenous peoples are "Ecologically Noble" (Balée 1998) . Sometimes, the rhetoric developed by these organizations is appropriated by indigenous groups and considered their own (Brosius 2000) . Furthermore, these agencies hold generalizations about indigenous peoples around the world, granting them homogenous knowledge, understanding, and care for the environment. For instance, Durning (1992) states, "Amid the endless variety of indigenous belief, there is striking unity in the sacredness of ecological systems" (1992:209). These generalizations were applied to and assumed by the Ngöbe. In a story written by Marcelo Ábrego, a Ngöbe man who was a member of the Consulting Assembly, he noted that one important characteristic of the Ngöbe was "to live in harmony with nature, conserve its resources, and make good use of them" by respecting their ancestral values (ADEPESCO 2000:25) . This discourse was very effective within the overall environmental truth enforced by organizations such as TNC, PROARCA/COSTAS, or even STRI. However, some of the practices detailed during the many meetings demonstrated that, in some cases, the Ngöbe were as destructive of their marine environment as Afro-Antilleans.
The lack of general representation of the civil society in the efforts of the plan was another predicament. Although the organizations that developed the plan indeed corresponded to an important part of the civil society, they were not representative of the Bocatorenean society as a whole. In fact, a representative from the island of Bastimentos only joined the process when the proposed plan had been almost finalized. These problems created tensions among the organizers of the plan and civil society. For the most part, members of the communities in the Archipelago felt that those, rather than the people who were running the Assembly did not represent them adequately, because they were mostly people with formal education that worked for non-governmental and conservationist organizations and were seen as marginal to the community. Some residents of the Archipelago felt that this plan, although perhaps better than the arbitrary decision made by the government, was not concerned with the opinions of the majority of members of the Bocatorenean civil society.
The perception of the local Bocatorenean populations not involved in the development of the project was that there was a double standard incorporated in the implementation of the plan; while there were fines and consequences for violating the laws for the poor (illegal harvesting of conch, fish, and lobster), there were exceptions and opportunities for influential foreigners and locals (construction permits in mangrove areas, unchecked tourism development and land use). Although one of the main goals of the plan was to control land sales to, and construction by, foreigners, the perception of the local population was that the only beneficiaries of the plan ultimately were the participating NGOs and local and national government officials. This added to existing problems of animosity and prejudices of non-Indians towards indigenous peoples in the Archipelago. As Badilla Forest (2000) notes, one of the main lessons to learn about MPA management plans is that "constituency building and accountability of decisions are crucial steps in the planning and acceptance of a management programme for marine protected areas" (2000:341) . Consensus building is essential, especially when a society is ethnically diverse, and when there is a long history of mistrust among ethnicities, but also between the government and the civil society. Undoubtedly, under these circumstances, consensus building is also especially difficult.
In terms of gender differences, there were many more men than women involved in the project. In a group of 24 to 30 people, there were three or four women, none of them indigenous. Although the literature on MPAs clearly notes that women's participation is essential for the success of a program (cf. van Ingen 2000:355) , women were not involved as an important part of the process, with the exception of the few women who represented non-governmental organizations or conservation agencies. I mentioned to one of the organizers that there were no indigenous women in the process and that they surely had important input to add to the process. Following our conversation, the organizer announced in one of the meetings that indigenous leaders could bring their wives and families to upcoming meetings. At the next meeting, however, women did not sit at the main tables but on the side (where I and other observers sat) and they did not actively participate in the discussions. The meeting organizers interpreted lack of outspoken participation as lack of interest. However, women were active participants in meetings in their communities, and supported and influenced the views of the men (cf. Young and Bort 1976) . Participants in the Assembly felt that it was a waste of money to bring the women to the process. They continued to attend the meetings, but they were mostly perceived as a burden. Since I was perceived as an "ally" of Afro-Antilleans and as a result, my formal participation in the meetings was already challenged, I was not able to continue to pressure the organizers to incorporate women into the process. An alternative approach to women's participation would have been to develop special meetings directed to women exclusively.
In spite of the problems addressed above, some of the goals and ideas of the Consulting Assembly were positive for the Bocatorenean community. The participants in these efforts learned about grassroots organizing, conservation, and resource management. Dialogue about these subjects was freely included in the assembly's agenda; the parties involved can use this knowledge and experience in future initiatives. In addition-and although not much action was taken-the group was highly critical of the excessive and uncontrolled tourism exploitation and the rampant corruption by local and national officials. The environmental education program organized by the Consulting Assembly was also a positive result of the process. Members of different indigenous communities where the program was carried out informed me that this program was effective, well received, and had an important impact in the communities. PROMAR (A Panamanian foundation for the Protection of the Sea), the organization that ran these programs, wisely hired a Ngöbe schoolteacher to give the talks in Ngöbere, to use visual material, and to guarantee that the majority of people could join the talks by holding them after school hours, and by associating with the indigenous leaders in each community.
Conclusion
Latin American governments have tended to have a developmental rather than a conservationist agenda for their countries, even when it comes to environmental efforts. The Panamanian government has publicly emphasized ecotourism as part of its tourism and conservation strategies, but in reality has promoted high-end tourism projects where conservation is not the main goal. With the possible exception of the Canopy Tower located near Panama City, the tourism projects carried out, sponsored, or advertised by the Panamanian Bureau of Tourism are not ecotourism-related projects. The management plan proposed by the Consulting Assembly was envisioned as a grassroots project with important stakeholder participation. It is likely that the Panamanian government did not consider the plan because it was conceived as a low-scale, locally managed project whose main goal was conservation and scientific research rather than profit.
Aside from the government's lack of support for the initiative, the experience of the creation and development of the Consulting Assembly and the management plan is especially important. The language of science took primacy in the process of creation of the Consulting Assembly and the development of the Management Plan. As Tsing (2001) notes, "scientific frameworks move scientists as well as broader audiences in conjunction with the poetic and political imaginations they bring to bear on nature; these are features of their explanatory power" (Tsing 2001:6) . The international environmental institutions that financed the PNMIB project had a specific notion of resource conservation, and consequently, those involved in the project worked with national and local conservationist organizations. Groups that were seen as not fitting the pattern of "conservation" were left out. Thus, Afro-Antilleans as an ethnic group were not included in the project, with the exception of a few Afro-Antillean individuals representing organizations rather than the AfroAntillean community.
Ultimately, the issue of "who talks for whom and who constructs representations of whom" becomes crucial (Brosius 2000:311) . Due to the powerful discourses of conservation and ecotourism developed by local, regional, and national NGOs, Ngöbe indigenous groups were incorporated because they "fit" the concept of indigenous peoples with knowledge of the environment. La Rusic notes that it is common among some politicians, teachers, writers, anthropologists, and I might add, environmentalists, to believe that indigenous peoples are "phylogenetically encoded as conservationists " (1985:24) . However, the Ngöbe were still patronized and believed to lack sufficient conservationist arguments to actively participate in the process (Cf. Sundberg 2003) . The Ngöbe might not have been perceived as the quintessential "pristine indigenous innocents living a timeless existence" (Brosius 2003:94) , but they were perceived as environmentally friendly indigenous peoples who had been forced to leave their sustainable ways and adapt to changing conditions; the environmentalist organizations wanted to help them "go back" to their pristine ways. This, however, needed to be accomplished in the terms of conservationism as understood by these organizations. Afro-Antilleans were never in that category. Paradoxically, although a few Afro-Antilleans were in leading positions in the process, their attitudes toward their fellow Afro-Antilleans were also paternalistic. Some members of the assembly indeed felt that indigenous peoples had more familiarity with the environment than Afro-Antilleans.
Similarly to what Sundberg notes for the Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala, the international, regional, and national organizations that worked for the development of the management plan operated under the notion that science is bias-free, and by having scientists from STRI and other organizations as members of their team, scientific knowledge was privileged and asserted as the truth. "Knowing the truth about a place grants the knower a certain amount of power in relationship with those who are not considered to have access to that knowledge (i.e., they have not been trained in Western ways of knowing)" (Sundberg 2003:52; emphasis in original text) . In the case of the management plan in Bocas del Toro, these organizations were perceived as having ownership of the truth and thus indigenous knowledge was dismissed as pseudo-truth. In Bocas, those who were able to learn to express this language of conservation were immersed in the discourse and learned to articulate various cultural values and practices through their relationships with NGOs, researchers, and scientists and became cultural intermediaries. Afro-Antilleans were not able to articulate this discourse, and thus were left behind in the process. In fact, some of their practices were in flagrant contradiction with the conservationist discourse (turtle meat consumption, water contamination, garbage disposal) and thus, the Consulting Assembly perceived them as unable to understand the "true" sense of conservation. Another contributing element was that the rhetoric used by the nongovernmental organizations and leaders of the Consulting Assembly was that of western science. The Ngöbe were recognized as having some level of traditional knowledge of the environment; Afro-Antilleans were seen as having none. But scientific knowledge-incorporating scientific discourse, studies, and references-was viewed as the preeminent source of knowledge about marine and rainforest resources, not the knowledge of those who used these resources on a daily basis.
Conservation organizations use different strategies to draw attention to their discourses. In the case reported by Brosius regarding the Penan in Malaysia, the nongovernmental organizations underscored indigenous peoples such as the Penan as the panacea of conservation. Yet, in conflating preservation of biodiversity and indigenous rights, they portrayed them as "fragile objects of aesthetic appreciation" due to their pristine beauty and innocence (Brosius 2003:97) . The Ngöbe were not portrayed as such by the organizations in Bocas del Toro, perhaps because they were envisioned as "too western." They wore western clothes, spoke Spanish and English, and had had contact with the West for many years. They were not as ideally untouched and knowledgeable. However, as I have demonstrated in this article, conflicts regarding conservation do not only occur between powerless local populations (indigenous or otherwise) and powerful international donor agencies. The case of the creation of the management plan in Bocas del Toro reveals the complexities that result from discrepant views of what constitutes "good management practices" and environmental knowledge within the populations that are the target of conservationists, discrepancies that result in part from ethnic, racial, social, and educational differences.
Governments, private organizations, and intellectuals in the South have denounced the claims of knowledge and ownership of international agencies as yet another example of colonial management science practices granted, in many circumstances because of their own agenda and political claims (Greenough and Tsing 2001; Brosius 2001) . While current critiques of the agendas and ulterior motives of large conservation organizations are essential, it is also necessary to consider that smaller NGOs are also politicized entities that often times respond to narrow views of development, conservation, and knowledge. In Bocas del Toro, both the larger international and smaller national/local NGOs wholeheartedly supported the discourse of environmental truth and global environmentalism brought by the donor agencies and supporting scientific institutions. Dissenting voices challenging the discourse, and dissatisfaction and disagreement came from populations marginalized in the process, Afro-Antilleans and some indigenous leaders, not from the Panamanian government, Panamanian intellectuals, or private organizations.
Beyond the discursive level, the tensions that were present based on these different notions of environmental truth did not transform into overt conflicts between AfroAntilleans and indigenous peoples. Stereotypes of each other continued and they continue today, but they are diffused within the community. There is no overt conflict where they do not speak to each other or would use violence to prevent the use of resources. It is, as in other aspects of community life, a more covert approach to conflict, where people live their daily lives, might even offer job opportunities to each other, but each group believes that it is superior and better. Likewise, there were no overt conflicts between the rangers and the Afro-Antillean turtle hunters. The hunters, both Afro-Antilleans and Ngöbe, avoided the rangers, who had (and continue to have) very little enforcement power simply because of their limited number and lack of resources. Tensions existed among NGOs as well, but the organizations worked together despite resentment of the philosophy and monopoly over international funding of ANCON (National Association for the Conservation of Nature).
The Consulting Assembly attempted to develop a management plan for the use of marine resources that would be an acceptable compromise among indigenous peoples and non-indigenous residents in the Archipelago, conservationist organizations, and tourists. Whether the goals of the management plan will be achieved following the cessation of TNC funding in 2000, the continuing lack of official government support, and the dissolution of the Assembly is problematic.
Notes
1 However, it is important to note that the creation of the park itself was beneficial for the overall protection of the environment in the Archipelago. This is particularly true now that the US-based company Red Frog Beach Club has purchased a third of Bastimentos Island and will build over two hundred homes, two golf courses and other amenities on the island. Red Frog Beach Club is adjacent to the PNMIB.
2 This initiative provides funding for park management in Latin America and the Caribbean, as an "emergency effort to safeguard the most important and most imperiled natural areas in the hemisphere" (Stanley 1995:24) . 3 Regional Environmental Program for Central America. 4 The members of the Executive Committee included the Director of the PNMIB, the representatives of IPAT and ANAM to the Consulting Assembly, one representative of the indigenous communities, one representative of the local/national NGOs, and one representative of the tourism businesses to the Consulting Assembly.
5 I was not able to obtain specific information about the reasons for the discontinuing of funding of the project by the TNC and the lack of support to the plan by the Moscoso government. The TNC currently funds the efforts of ADEPESCO, an alliance of eleven indigenous fishing communities, in Bocas del Toro (http://nature.org/wherewework/fieldguide/projectprofiles). 6 Osvaldo Jordan, November 2004, personal communication. 7 Osvaldo Jordan, November 2004, personal communication. 8 The qualification requested for the rangers was primary education and training seminars on management, administration, and protected areas (Consejo Consultivo 1999b:6) . 
